Regulatory capital and economic capital. by Tiesset, M. & Troussard, P.
Regulatory capital and economic capital
 M URIEL TIESSET  PHILIPPE TROUSSARD
   General surveillance of the Banking System Department  General surveillance of the Banking System Department
  General Secretariat of the Banking Commission    General Secretariat of the Banking Commission
  Banking Studies Division  International Affairs Division
The connection between the concepts of regulatory capital and economic capital appears at ﬁ  rst glance 
to be relatively obvious. Prudential standards, from which the notion of regulatory capital directly stems, 
are intended to ensure the soundness and stability of individual ﬁ  nancial institutions and of the ﬁ  nancial 
system as a whole. Thus the capital ratio links the concerns of regulators to those of bank directors and 
stockholders, resulting in a partial convergence in the methods for calculating regulatory and economic 
capital, and also, to some extent, in the objectives underlying those calculations.
Over the past two decades, the convergence in the methodologies underlying these two concepts has been 
reinforced by the establishment of increasingly sophisticated prudential mechanisms – from the Cooke ratio 
in 1988 to the recent innovations introduced by the Basel II Accord – and by the parallel development of 
more efﬁ  cient tools for measuring and analyzing banking risks. Thus the new Basel Accord, in providing a 
measure of regulatory capital that better reﬂ  ects the risks inherent in each type of portfolio, resembles in 
many respects the methods that banks use to measure economic capital.
In a banking environment that is both more risky and more competitive, efforts on the part of banks and 
supervisors to improve the solvency of the banking system must take into account the capacity of banks 
to earn proﬁ  ts while limiting excessive risk-taking. In the pursuit of proﬁ  ts, banks have a clear interest in 
reducing their credit risk, since this will tend to increase their margins, all other things being equal. This 
reduction in credit risk improves the efﬁ  ciency of banks, and at the same time helps guarantee the ﬁ  nancial 
health of individual institutions and the stability of the ﬁ  nancial system as a whole.
Despite these links, regulatory capital and economic capital do not necessarily coincide, because they 
serve fundamentally different objectives. The ultimate objectives of supervisors are to protect depositors, 
ensure the soundness of ﬁ  nancial institutions, and prevent ﬁ  nancial crises. The objective of bank directors 
is to maximize the return to their shareholders, by maximizing the proﬁ  ts generated by the bank’s activities 
through the optimal allocation of capital across different business lines. Thus economic capital is concerned 
with the internal management of the institution, while regulatory capital is about ensuring the solvency of 
the institution and of the ﬁ  nancial sector as a whole.
While the tendency for regulatory capital and economic capital to converge is generally viewed as beneﬁ  cial, 
a perfect alignment of the two concepts would not be desirable, for several reasons. To begin with, internal 
systems for measuring risks still have serious limitations, and the methods for measuring different types of 
risk are still very fragmented. Furthermore, the objectives of large ﬁ  nancial conglomerates are not always 
consistent with the goal of ﬁ  nancial stability. Finally, an alignment of internal practices could result in a higher 
degree of correlation of risk exposures across institutions, increasing systemic risk in the banking system.
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1| REGULATORY CAPITAL 
AND ECONOMIC CAPITAL: 
CONCEPTUAL DIFFERENCES 
1|1 Regulatory  capital: 
the 1988 Accord
The international capital standard established in 
1988 by the Basel Committee, commonly referred 
to as the ‘Cooke’ ratio, sought to bring an end to 
a gradual deterioration in the ratio of capital to 
exposures in the banking system. The leverage 
of banks – the ratio of debt to capital – had risen 
signiﬁ  cantly in G10 countries, particularly in Japan, 
in the preceding years. This increase in leverage 
enabled banks to compensate for a decline in the 
proﬁ  tability of their operations with an increase in 
the volume of activity, thus maintaining their return 
on capital. However, this increase in leverage had 
two harmful consequences: it led to a race for size, 
with thin capitalization conferring a competitive 
advantage; and it reduced the capacity of banks 
to withstand economic downturns. The effects of 
leverage are the same for banks as for other types 
of businesses, but banks typically have much higher 
leverage ratios than non-ﬁ  nancial corporations. This 
higher leverage increases the return on capital when 
transactions are proﬁ  table, but it also ampliﬁ  es losses 
when the return on transactions turns negative, if 
provisions for losses have not previously been made. 
Thus the narrower a bank’s capital base, the weaker 
is its capacity to absorb losses. 
The Cooke ratio established a minimum capital 
requirement, set at eight percent of risk-weighted 
assets. Eligible capital – the numerator of the ratio – 
was deﬁ  ned broadly, to include not only capital and 
reserves (core or “Tier 1” capital), but also certain 
forms of subordinated debt (supplementary or
“Tier 2” capital). The denominator of the ratio was the 
sum of the bank’s exposures multiplied by risk weightings 
reﬂ  ecting, in a simpliﬁ  ed fashion, their level of risk: 
0 percent for sovereigns (OECD government securities), 
20 percent for claims on OECD banks, and 100 percent 
for virtually all other exposures. Off-balance-sheet 
liabilities were included by applying credit conversion 
factors: for example, credit lines to businesses with an 
original maturity of more than one year were counted 
at 50 percent of their nominal amount.
The Cooke ratio had the twin objectives of protecting 
depositors and strengthening ﬁ  nancial stability. Its 
intermediate objective was to encourage banks 
to restore the proﬁ  tability of their operations: no 
longer able to increase their leverage, banks would 
be induced to choose between exposures on the 
basis of their return relative to regulatory capital 
requirements. The standard ensured a level playing 
ﬁ  eld, because of the high degree of consistency in 
its application to banks. Initially targeted only at 
large, internationally active banks in G10 countries, 
it was eventually adopted by almost all countries 
and extended to all banks, regardless of their size. 
The wide adoption of the Cooke ratio outside the G10 
is one sign of its success. Another sign has been the 
increase in the capital of banking institutions in the 
years following its adoption (see table below). On 
the whole, the standard increased the resilience of 
the banking sector to the shocks resulting from the 
liberalization of the ﬁ  nancial sector in the 1980s.
However, the simplicity of the Cooke ratio, which 
was initially its strength, has over time become a 
handicap. The risk weights assigned by the standard 
do not adequately reﬂ  ect the actual level of risk: 
for example, a high-margin loan to a company 
presenting a high risk of default implies the same 
capital charge as a low-margin loan to a high-quality 
corporate borrower. This has encouraged banks to 
engage in regulatory arbitrage: expanding lending 
to risky borrowers and removing less risky – and 
therefore less remunerative – loans from the balance 
sheet, in order to increase the return on regulatory 
capital. The emergence of securitization techniques 
in the 1980s and their standardization in the 1990s 
made it easy for banks to remove relatively riskless, 
and therefore lower yielding, assets from their 
balance sheets. As a consequence, the average risk of 
exposures remaining on the balance sheet increased, 
without a corresponding increase in their capital 
charge, which was insensitive to the level of risk. 
This trend accelerated towards the end of the 1990s 
with the development of new tools for transferring 
credit risk – credit derivatives – which provided the 
building blocks for synthetic securitizations and 
made it easier and less costly to transfer the credit 
risk associated with balance-sheet assets.
While these techniques for transferring credit risk give 
the appearance of removing risks completely from the 
balance sheet (conventional securitization) or hedging 
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risks that remain on the balance sheet (synthetic 
securitization), in practice banks generally retain
ﬁ  rst-loss positions in order to protect investors. Banks 
also provide liquidity lines to support their securitization 
structures. These lines appear as off-balance sheet 
liabilities and draw little or no capital charges.
In addition, the allocation of credit has been distorted 
by certain risk weights, such as the 20 percent risk 
weight for claims with a maturity of less than one 
year on banks in non-OECD countries.
These undesirable side effects of the 1988 Accord, and 
the limited success in curbing them, are attributable 
not so much to the ratio itself as to the ﬁ  nancial 
community’s adoption of the regulatory standard 
as an internal measure of risk and proﬁ  tability. 
Initially intended simply as a regulatory tool, the 
Change in capital ratios in G10 countries between 1989 and 1996
(percentage point)
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1989-1996
Belgium 1.6 0.6 0.1 0.7 0.7 1 -0.4 0 4.3
Canada 0.7 -0.3 1.3 0.2 0.9 0 -0.1 -0.6 2.1
France 0.1 -0.1 0.6 -0.4 0.4 0.4 -0.1 0.2 1.1
Germany 0.3 -1.2 0 0.5 0.3 0.3 -0.2 -0.5 -0.5
Italy 0 -0.2 1 -0.1 0.7 0.3 -0.3 0.3 1.7
Japan -1.5 -0.4 -1.1 1.2 0.4 -0.9 0.4 -0.2 -2.1
Luxembourg -0.2 0.7 0.4 0.4 0.3 2.1 -0.1 0.3 3.9
Netherlands 0.6 -0.8 -0.2 0 0.7 0 -0.2 0.3 0.4
Sweden -0.2 0.1 0.1 -0.3 2.4 2.1 1.1 -1.3 4
Switzerland -0.1 -0.6 0.3 -0.2 0.1 0.1 1.2 0.5 1.3
United Kingdom 0.1 -0.1 0.7 -0.4 0.8 0.8 -0.1 0.8 2.6





Capital ratio: the relationship between regulatory capital (the numerator of the ratio) and risk-weighted assets (the denominator). 
Total capital must be at least eight percent, and core capital at least four percent, of total risk-weighted assets.
Regulatory capital: deﬁ  ned by banking supervisors, it includes:
• Core (“Tier 1”) capital, consisting mainly of shareholders’ equity and disclosed reserves;
• Supplementary (“Tier 2”) capital, consisting mainly of undisclosed and revaluation reserves, perpetual (“Upper Tier 2”) 
and term subordinated debt (“Lower Tier 2”);
• “Tier 3” capital, consisting mainly of short-term subordinated debt used exclusively to cover market risk.
Regulatory capital requirement: the amount of regulatory capital that each credit institution must hold, set as a function of 
the risks borne by the institution. The requirement must be met on a continuous basis, and is monitored by the competent 
bank supervisor.
Economic capital
Economic capital or economic capital charge: the amount of economic own funds that the institution judges is necessary 
to cover its risks, expressed in absolute terms or as a percentage.
Economic own funds: deﬁ  ned by the institution, it generally includes shareholders’ equity and reserves. Some institutions 
enlarge the deﬁ  nition of capital to include instruments of lower quality.
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Cooke ratio has become a universally accepted tool 
for assessing banks’ performance and soundness. 
The regulatory standard has thus become a victim of 
its own success. The extension of the ratio to uses for 
which it was not originally intended has highlighted 
its limitations: it is not designed to capture all types 
of risks, or to measure their actual levels, and thus 
can mislead unsophisticated users.
1|2  Economic capital: an 
individualized measure which 
seeks to capture all types of risk
ECONOMIC CAPITAL IS DEFINED 
BY EACH INSTITUTION
While there is only one deﬁ  nition of regulatory capital 
and of the regulatory capital ratio, each institution 
that applies the concept of economic capital has 
its own deﬁ  nition of economic capital. And while 
regulatory capital requirements are imposed on 
institutions, economic capital charges are set by 
each institution as a function of the environment 
in which it operates.
Institutions deﬁ  ne and set their economic capital 
objectives in response to conﬂ  icting demands from 
a variety of outside parties – shareholders, rating 
agencies, bondholders, and counterparties in 
derivatives markets – and also in response to internal 
management needs. Economic capital feeds into the 
management process both at the level of the bank 
as a whole, and at the level of individual investment 
decisions (transactions, portfolios, business lines). 
Management based on economic capital makes it 
possible for a ﬁ  nancial institution to identify the 
transactions and the business lines that represent 
the best use of available capital. 
To satisfy shareholders, directors seek to maximize 
the return on invested capital. Since the smaller the 
amount of capital invested, the greater is the return 
on equity (RoE), all other things being equal, this 
objective leads to the pursuit of an optimal allocation 
of capital.
The rating agencies, in their role as the provider of 
credit ratings for bonds issued by the institutions, 
represent the interests of bond investors. As such, they 
value high levels of capital – although their ratings 
depend not only on the institution’s capital, but also on 
its business prospects, the quality of its management, 
its risk proﬁ  le, its degree of diversiﬁ  cation, and other 
factors. An institution’s rating – and the link between 
its capital and its rating – are all the more important 
given that the institution’s ability to participate in the 
derivatives market is conditioned on its receiving a 
rating equal to or higher than AA- or its equivalent. 
In addition, a high rating is necessary to obtain access 
to the inter-bank market, and to obtain competitive 
ﬁ  nancing terms. 
In practice, the level of economic capital is set by 
the institution’s management in order to achieve a 
target external credit rating for its own debt. Most 
banks have converged on a target rating of AA-, 
which, according to the rating agencies’ historical 
data, corresponds to a 0.03 percent probability 
of default at a one-year horizon. In other words, 
the AA- rating objective adopted by a majority of 
banks implies holding sufﬁ  cient capital to cover the
bank’s losses 99.97 percent of the time. This 
calculation assumes that the average losses associated 
with the banks exposures (“expected losses” or EL) 
are already covered by provisioning or interest 
margins. Economic capital is thus the buffer that each 
ﬁ  nancial institution considers necessary to absorb 
its “unexpected losses” (UL), given its risk proﬁ  le 
and its external rating objective. An AA- rating also 
signiﬁ  es a 3.5 percent probability of a decline in the 
rating from AA- to A at a one-year horizon, based on 
the same rating agency data. The one-year horizon 
is considered pertinent because it corresponds to the 
frequency of ﬁ  nancial statements, and also to the 
management horizon for selling assets or tapping 
the markets.
The process of determining economic capital 
strengthens internal risk management and helps 
banks set their strategic objectives. The establishment 
of an internal budget discipline, which sets budgets 
as a function of an internal proﬁ  tability objective, 
also promotes the optimal allocation of resources. 
This entails positive consequences for the stability of 
the ﬁ  nancial system, since institutions using these 
methods often have systemic importance.
However, the constituents of economic capital are 
not necessarily identical to those of regulatory 
capital. In practice, institutions tend to include the 
most permanent elements – shareholders’ equity 
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and reserves – in common with the rating agencies, 
which focus on the strongest elements of core capital 
(“Core Tier 1”).
ECONOMIC CAPITAL IS CALCULATED 
FOR EACH TYPE OF RISK
Once the economic capital objective has been 
selected and the constituent elements of capital 
deﬁ  ned, the main difﬁ  culty lies in estimating risks. 
The goal is to provide a measure of risk-adjusted 
capital speciﬁ  c to each type of banking activity. 
The problem lies in the diversity of risks borne by 
credit institutions, each of which has very distinct 
characteristics, calling for different measurement 
techniques. It is difﬁ  cult to come up with a single 
tool or a common methodology for measuring all of 
these risks. However, economic capital is intended to 
cover all risks: not only those that loom largest or are 
most easily measured (credit risk and market risk) 
but also operational risk, interest-rate risk, liquidity 
risk, strategic risk, reputation risk, concentration 
risk, transfer risk, insurance risk, etc.
Although the methodologies for measuring risk are 
still evolving, value-at-risk (VaR) is the most widely 
used method for estimating aggregate risk. It has the 
advantage of being able to quantify and incorporate 
correlations between risks. But it is based on strong 
assumptions, and not all risks can be quantiﬁ  ed in 
terms of VaR. 
VaR is the principal and most widely used 
methodology for measuring market risk, but even 
for these operations, it has limitations. For example, 
it cannot take into account the risks resulting from 
the illiquidity of certain products, in particular 
structured products, whose value can change rapidly 
and in a nonlinear fashion. For such products, 
approaches using stress tests are beginning to appear. 
The results of these approaches in terms of capital at 
risk depend naturally on the assumptions on which 
the stress tests are based.
For credit risk, most institutions use models 
which estimate the distribution of potential 
losses. The most widely used measure is RAROC
(see Box 2). Some banks use KMV-type approaches, 
which measure the distance to default.
While relatively sophisticated quantitative approaches 
have been developed for certain types of risk (market 
risk, and to a lesser extent credit risk), the quantitative 
methods currently available for other risks are much 
less rigorous, and the methods applied to some risks 
remain essentially qualitative. 
The adoption of Basel II has encouraged institutions 
to adopt more quantitative approaches for 
operational risk, but actual methodologies are still 
being developed. Liquidity risk, while a major risk 
for banks, is not generally subject to an economic 
capital charge because of the difﬁ  culty in quantifying 
this risk and in establishing a direct link between the 
level of capital and the capacity for reﬁ  nancing.
Strategic risk is taken into account by some banks, 
although its deﬁ  nition varies widely from one bank 
to the next. It is generally understood to signify 
the risk that proﬁ  ts will decline as the result of a 
drop in business volume with costs remaining less 
ﬂ  exible. Reputation risk is even less well deﬁ  ned, 
and is not always identiﬁ  ed as a risk as such,
with some institutions considering it to be
included in operational risk, business risk, or 
compliance risk.
For banking groups that also sell insurance, 
insurance risk can also be included, but this raises 
the problem of aggregating insurance risk with 
banking risks.
Institutions should be conscious of the intrinsic 
limitations of any methodology for estimating 
risks, due to weaknesses in the historical data, the 
existence of low-probability events not represented 
in the historical data, problems associated with the 
valuation of assets (market value or historic cost), and 
the necessarily simplistic assumptions underlying 
the models. In recognition of these limitations, Pillar 
2 of the Basel II framework requires institutions to 
conduct stress tests to complement their analysis of 
risks under Pillar 1.
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Box 2
Calculation and uses of economic capital
Economic capital represents a buffer covering the gap 
between the average expected return to a given activity 
and the average “unexpected losses” (UL) associated with 
abnormally low returns.
The size of this capital buffer is a function of the risk 
proﬁ  le of the activity, which can be expressed in terms of 
the probability distribution of the income that it generates; 
and of the ﬁ  nancial institution’s degree of risk aversion, 
reﬂ  ected by the institution’s external rating objective and 
the corresponding conﬁ  dence threshold (Y in the graph).
Y is generally deﬁ   ned by the relevant institution for 
each business line. For example, if Y is set at 99% of 
the distribution of income function, this means that the 
institution is willing to accept a level of income lower than 
Y in one case out of 100. The amount of economic capital 
required by this strategy is the difference between average 
income and Y.
Economic capital and operational risk management: monitoring of indicators related  to economic capital (RoC, RAROC)
RoE (return on equity: the ratio of a given measure of earnings -Net interest margin, Net interest margin and fees, Net 
operating income before or after tax-  to own  funds as they appear on the balance sheet), while providing a measure of 




RoE has two major drawbacks as a tool for the operational management of risk. First, the accounting measure of own 
funds is an inadequate indicator of risk. And second, RoE is deﬁ  ned only at the level of the institution as a whole, since 
own funds are not allocated to speciﬁ  c transactions or business lines.
To improve the assessment of risk, own funds can be replaced in the formula by the economic capital assigned to a 
particular business unit. The resulting measure, RoC (return on capital), provides an initial evaluation of the risk/return 
tradeoff by production unit.
RoCi  = earnings i
capital charge i
(2)
The numerator of formula (2) uses the same measure of proﬁ  tability as RoE but applies it to a given transaction or business line (i). 
As for RoE this measure of proﬁ  tability is not harmonized.  Each institution sets its own standard. The denominator of the formula 
represents the capital charge (or economic capital) for the underlying risk of the transaction or business line. The substitution 
of economic capital to own funds in accounting terms in the denominator makes it possible to measure the contribution of each 
business line or transaction to overall performance, taking into account the underlying risk of each activity. RoC can thus be used 
to evaluate the contribution of  each business line to the risk/return performance at the level of the institution as a whole.
RAROC (risk-adjusted return on capital) is derived directly from the RoC approach. One of the most common deﬁ  nitions of RAROC for 
a particular activity or business line is a RoC adjusted for the expected losses (EL) associated with the loss distribution of activity (i).
RAROC = earnings i – EL i
capital charge i
(3)
RAROC is thus a measure of risk-adjusted performance. It is used by directors as a monitoring and management tool, and 
serves as the foundation for allocating capital among different business lines. 
Calculation of economic capital
Distribution of income 
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In view of the shortcomings of the Cooke ratio 
mentioned above, the Basel Committee began work in 
1998 on a new, more risk-sensitive capital standard. The 
Committee’s goals were, on the one hand, to counter 
the growing problem of regulatory arbitrage, and, on 
the other hand, to encourage banks to adopt sounder 
practices for managing their risks. Consequently, the 
Basel II Accord, adopted in June 2004, has introduced 
greater convergence between regulatory capital 
requirements and economic capital. 
The Basel II Accord focuses mainly on credit risk 
and operational risk. It deals only peripherally with 
market risk, which was the subject of an earlier Basel 
agreement (the 1996 Market Risk Amendment) that 
brought prudential standards and economic capital 
into closer alignment. The 1996 amendment permits 
institutions to use their own internal models to 
calculate regulatory capital charges for market risk, 
subject to supervisory approval. 
The Basel II framework consists of three ‘Pillars’ 
which are intended to be mutually reinforcing. All 
three Pillars tend to align regulatory capital more 
closely with economic capital:
• Pillar 1 is a minimum capital requirement that every 
bank must satisfy, covering the credit risk, market 
risk, and operational risk generated by its activities.
• Pillar 2 is an individualized supervisory review which 
can lead the supervisory authority to increase the 
institution’s Pillar 1 capital requirement if warranted 
by the institution’s risk proﬁ  le.
• Pillar 3 provides for increased market discipline 
through improved ﬁ  nancial disclosure on the part 
of the banks.
2|1  Estimating risk under Pillar 1
The major innovation of Pillar 1 is that it offers 
banks the option of using their own internal systems 
to determine their regulatory capital requirements 
for credit risk and operational risk. Thus Basel II 
is based on the constituent elements of economic 
capital, and encourages banks to strengthen them.
For credit risk, banks will be able to use their internal 
rating systems (IRB) – provided they comply with 
minimum requirements designed to ensure their 
soundness and robustness – to estimate the key 
parameters of credit risk: the probability of default 
(PD), loss given default (LGD), exposure at default 
(EAD), and effective maturity (M) of the exposures in 
their portfolios. Banks will estimate these parameters 
using internal data, complemented by external data. 
The risk parameters PD, LGD, EAD, and M will 
be entered in a regulatory risk-weighting function 
based on the ASFR model (see Box 3) to calculate 
the bank’s regulatory capital requirement.
For operational risk 1, Basel II permits the use of 
internal models (the Advanced Measurement 
Approach, or AMA), subject to supervisory approval. 
Some institutions are developing essentially 
statistical (“top-down”) models. These models 
calculate capital from historical loss data (internal 
and external), using VaR methods (with a one-year 
time horizon and a 99.9 percent conﬁ  dence interval). 
Other institutions are building “bottom-up” models 
that place greater emphasis on forward-looking data, 
such as scenario analysis and exposure indicators.
Basel II encourages banks to construct or improve the 
basic elements that underlie the risk measurement 
systems used to measure economic capital. And for 
purposes of determining economic capital, these 
systems may be combined in ways that take into 
account correlations between risks: that is, the 
effects of diversiﬁ  cation or concentration.
1  See 2003 Annual Report of the Banking Commission: “Operational risk: Current practices and regulatory perspectives”.
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Box 3
The Asymptotic Single Risk Factor model underlying Basel II risk weights1  
1) Economic foundations of the Basel II risk-weighting formulas
A major constraint, in order to meet regulatory needs, was to be able to calculate the capital requirement for a given 
exposure based solely on the risk associated with that exposure, and not as a function of the composition of the portfolio 
in which it is held. The Basel Committee judged that full portfolio credit risk modeling would have introduced too much 
complexity for most banks and supervisory authorities, in the current state of modeling.
The model used by the Basel Committee is thus based on the hypothesis of an invariant portfolio. Under this assumption, 
the risk parameters associated with a transaction and a counterparty (PD, LGD, and EAD) are sufﬁ  cient for determining 
expected and unexpected losses (EL and UL). The formulas for risk-weighting are provided by the regulatory authority. 
Observed losses vary over time. Their distribution can be characterized by two variables: 
• expected loss (EL), which is the mean value of anticipated losses; 
• unexpected loss (UL), which represents losses in excess of expected losses. Their amount and the moment when they 
occur are not known in advance. The capital required by the regulatory risk-weighting function serves to cover these 
unexpected losses. 
2) Speciﬁ  cation of the model 
Expressing unexpected losses in terms of conditional default probabilities(PD)
In order to satisfy the constraint of portfolio invariance, the Basel Committee chose to use an “Asymptotic Single Risk 
Factor”(ASRF) model. In such a model, the risks of individual debtors do not depend on idiosyncratic factors (such as 
sectoral or geographical risks), and all systematic risk is captured by a single systematic risk factor. 
The ASRF model uses the average value of the PDs estimated by banks under normal business conditions to transform them 
into conditional default probabilities. This produces PDs that are sufﬁ  ciently conservative from a supervisory perspective, 
reﬂ  ecting conditions in an economic recession: i.e., the systematic risk factor is sufﬁ  ciently conservative. Technically, the 
model used by the Basel Committee is a simpliﬁ  ed version of the Merton model, the basic model used in the theory of 
asset valuation. 
Loss given default (LGD)
Average losses over extended periods of time can underestimate loss rates in an economic recession, and can therefore 
lead to an underestimation of unexpected loss. LGDs should therefore be conditioned on a recession scenario, in order to 
reﬂ  ect the loss rates experienced during a severe downturn. 
Unlike the case for PD, supervisors do not specify a regulatory formula for calculating conditional LGDs. It is up to the banks 
to provide estimates of LGD that are sufﬁ  ciently conservative, reﬂ  ecting loss rates in economic recessions, and taking into 
account possible correlations between PD and LGD in different portfolios. 
Maturity adjustment
Long-term loans are more risky than short-term loans. Consequently, capital requirements should increase with the 
remaining maturity of the exposure. 
The maturity adjustment is generated by a speciﬁ  c model, fed by the same conﬁ  dence interval and asset correlations 
used in the ASRF model. The risk premiums observed in capital market data have been used to derive the time structure 
of PDs (i.e. the likelihood and magnitude of PD changes over time). The model generates VaR measures as a function of 
PD and maturity. The maturity adjustments are the ratios of each of these VaR ﬁ  gures to the VAR of a ‘standard’ maturity, 
set at 2.5 years. 
1  An explanatory note ( “An explanatory note on the Basel II IRB risk weight functions”) is available on the BIS (www.bis.org).
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2|2  Pillar 2: a non-standardized 
approach to risks
The Cooke ratio took into account only a portion 
of the risks borne by credit institutions: credit risk 
and market risk. Basel II enlarges the spectrum of 
risks covered by prudential requirements to include 
operational risk, under Pillar 1, and all other risks 
borne by institutions, under Pillar 2. 
Pillar 2 also establishes a direct (although not automatic) 
link between economic capital and regulatory capital. 
Pillar 2 is notably based on two principles which refer 
to economic capital. The ﬁ  rst principle is that banks 
should put in place a procedure for determining and 
maintaining a capital level that is commensurate with 
their risk proﬁ  le, and a strategy for maintaining that 
level of capital adequacy. The procedure for assessing 
capital adequacy should cover all of the risks borne 
by the bank: credit risk, market risk, operational 
risk, interest-rate risk in the banking book, liquidity 
risk, and other risks such as reputation and strategic 
risk. The Basel Committee recognizes that some of 
these risks cannot always be measured precisely, 
but it requires banks to at least have a procedure 
for estimating them. This principle, which describes 
the internal process for determining the appropriate 
level of economic capital, transforms what had until 
now been a matter of sound practice into a regulatory 
requirement, by giving it an exhaustive content.
The assessment process should include stress tests 
that identify market events and market shifts likely to 
affect the bank, particularly in the area of credit risk. 
Stress tests are a particularly appropriate method for 
evaluating large shocks that materialize suddenly.
The second principle is that supervisors should 
review banks’ internal capital adequacy assessments 
Asset correlation
The systematic risk factor used in the model reﬂ  ects the state of the global economy; all obligors are linked to each other 
by this single risk factor. The degree of each debtor’s exposure to the systematic risk factor is expressed by an asset 
correlation, which can be described as the degree to which the debtor’s asset value depends on the general state of the 
economy. These correlations, which vary between different asset classes and different debtors, play an important role in 
the risk-weighting formulas. 
Asset correlations were estimated in the following fashion:
For the corporate, bank, and sovereign asset classes, two considerations were taken into account: 
• asset correlation decreases as PD increases: the default risk of a poorly-rated debtor depends less on the general state 
of the economy than on factors speciﬁ  c to the debtor.
• asset correlation increases with increasing ﬁ  rm size. The larger a company, the more its performance depends on the 
general state of the economy. An adjustment factor is therefore applied to ﬁ  rms with total annual turnover between 5 and 
50 million euros.
Correlations for retail banking were based on the economic capital data of major international banks and on historical loss 
data provided by G10 supervisors. The correlations vary across sub-classes within the retail asset class (housing loans, 
overdrafts and revolving credit lines, and other retail loans). 
Expected and unexpected losses 
The Basel model calculates the sum of expected and unexpected losses at a given conﬁ  dence interval. However, capital 
requirements are intended to cover only unexpected losses. Expected losses are therefore subtracted to determine the 
regulatory capital requirement. 
3) Calibration of the model
The conﬁ  dence interval is set at 99.9 percent at a one-year time horizon. This signiﬁ  es that a bank will experience losses 
in excess of its capital (Tier 1 + Tier 2) on average once every thousand years. The conﬁ  dence interval is included in the 
risk-weighting formula to provide a conservative value of the single risk factor. 
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and strategies and may impose remedial action. 
The supervisory review of the bank’s economic 
capital determination -which should contribute to 
systematizing the use of economic capital- could 
result in a requirement to hold additional capital – 
i.e., setting a regulatory capital requirement greater 
than eight percent – or to improve the bank’s internal 
risk-management systems.
2|3  Pillar 3 and market discipline
Pillar 3 aims at strengthening market discipline 
through better and more complete disclosure of 
ﬁ  nancial information by banks. The information 
disclosed should be complete, should include 
qualitative as well as quantitative information, and 
should cover the bank’s risk management procedures 
and its methods for determining and maintaining 
capital adequacy. These new requirements create 
a standardized disclosure framework that will make 
it easier to compare the risk measurement methods 
and the level of risk of different institutions.
The introduction of Basel II, by emphasizing banks’ 
internal measurement systems, contributes at 
the same time to aligning regulatory capital more 
closely with economic capital, and improving the 
techniques that banks use to calculate economic 
capital. To be eligible for the advanced approaches 
in Basel II, credit institutions must satisfy strict 
operational requirements. In addition to ensuring 
the reliability of regulatory capital requirements, 
this should improve the measurement of economic 
capital. However, while the two notions are coming 
into closer alignment with each other, their objectives 
and methodologies remain distinct. 
3| E CONOMIC AND 
REGULATORY CAPITAL: 
DISTINCT OBJECTIVES
3|1  The operational management 
objectives served by economic 
capital are not fully compatible 
with the goal of ﬁ  nancial 
stability
Credit ratings and PDs







Source: S&P cumulative average corporate default rate 1981-2004; 
January 2005
The process that an institution uses to determine 
and allocate economic capital is inseparable from 
its business strategy. For example, the conﬁ  dence 
level that corresponds to the credit rating targeted by 
the institution – for example, 0.29 percent for a BBB 
Standard and Poors rating (see Table) – is interpreted 
by the bank as an ‘acceptable’ probability of default. 
Thus, according to Table 1, in order to maintain an 
investment-grade credit rating (BBB or higher), the 
bank must have a probability of default at one year no 
greater than 0.29 percent. To achieve that objective, 
it must hold a sufﬁ  cient amount of economic capital 
to cover its annual VaR at a conﬁ  dence level of 99.71 
percent (100 minus 0.29). 
The use of a longer time horizon, assuming the 
institution’s risk proﬁ   le is unchanged, leads 
inevitably to higher default rates. For example, 
an institution initially rated BBB has a default 
probability of 6.1 percent at a horizon of ten years. 
Thus a target credit rating can be achieved either by 
changing the conﬁ  dence interval of the VaR – which 
is increased if the institution targets a better rating 
– or by extending (or reducing) the time horizon in 
an appropriate manner.
Clearly, the process for setting economic capital 
can conﬂ  ict with the goal of ﬁ  nancial stability. 
Risks taken into 
account in Pillar 1
Risks taken into 
account in Pillar 2
Credit risk
Market risk
Credit risk, including 
concentration risk
Operational risk Market risk
Operational risk
Interest-rate risk 
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The institution’s choice of a target credit rating, 
and thus of an acceptable probability of default, is 
not necessarily identical to the level of risk sought 
by the supervisor. Furthermore, the calculation of 
economic capital itself is not necessarily sufﬁ  ciently 
precise to ensure that economic capital satisﬁ  es 
prudential demands for capital adequacy and 
ﬁ  nancial strength.
Indeed, the foundations of economic capital measurement 
do not necessarily coincide with those of regulatory 
capital. In a recent paper (December 2004), Elizalde 
and Repullo demonstrate that, although economic 
capital and regulatory capital have some explanatory 
variables in common, they react differently to 
changes in those variables, and are also inﬂ  uenced 
by other risk factors which are not common to the 
two. In particular, in the context of the Asymptotic 
Single Risk Factor model of Basel II, they identify the 
common determinants of economic and regulatory 
capital, such as the probability of default of credit 
counterparties, the loss given default, and the 
exposure to systemic risk. According to their model, 
regulatory capital is more sensitive to variations 
in these variables than economic capital, which 
varies only over a limited range of the variables. 
In addition, economic capital (but not regulatory 
capital) is determined by variables affecting 
proﬁ  tability, such as the cost of bank capital and 
the intermediation margin. The study shows that the 
relative position of economic and regulatory capital 
is determined mainly by the cost of bank capital: if 
the cost of capital is lower (higher) than a threshold 
value set endogenously in the model, then economic 
capital will be higher (lower) than regulatory capital. 
Finally, the study shows that the level of regulatory 
capital depends on the conﬁ  dence level set by the 
supervisor and is not sensitive to variations in the 
proﬁ  tability variables.
This theoretical analysis, based on empirical data, 
raises the possibility of a conﬂ  ict between the bank’s 
objectives and the supervisor’s objectives, resulting from 
the disconnection between economic and regulatory 
capital. In particular, a reduction in the cost of capital 
or an increase in margins has a direct inﬂ  uence on 
the level and allocation of economic capital without 
necessarily adding to regulatory capital.
An additional point of divergence in the objectives 
underlying each type of capital lies in the still very 
fragmented nature of the framework for measuring, 
analyzing, and allocating economic capital in credit 
institutions.
In principle, these functions would need to be 
managed centrally in order to ensure that the same 
assumptions and methodologies are employed across 
all business lines and operational units. This implies 
that economic capital is allocated by product, as a 
necessary condition for ensuring the comparability 
and transparency of different business lines. It also 
assumes that the institution has deﬁ  ned common 
objectives and clear rules covering all of the risks in 
the different activities of the institution. In practice, 
the process is often interactive, using a ‘top-down’ 
and then a ‘bottom-up’ approach.
However, the management of risk in credit 
institutions remains relatively decentralized and 
fragmented, at best organized by business line, 
and often only by type of risk within each business 
line. While banks’ risk management units may be 
endowed with sophisticated statistical tools, some 
risks, such as reputation risk, remain difﬁ  cult to 
quantify. It is particularly difﬁ  cult to assess the 
global risk of a given activity, in view of the absence 
of methods for aggregating different types of risk in 
a single quantitative framework.
Furthermore, the decentralized character of risk 
management means that the allocation of economic 
capital is not always actualized. In some smaller 
subsidiaries, the allocation of capital is virtual, and 
the institution considers that the guarantee of the 
parent entity is sufﬁ  cient to cover potential losses 
resulting from the activities of the subsidiary. In 
such cases, the use of economic capital as a risk 
management tool falls short of the goal of being 
applied uniformly across the institution, and the 
regulatory requirements applied by the supervisor 
to most subsidiaries can conﬂ  ict with the operational 
management of the different entities.
In addition, some elements of the compensation of 
bank employees are directly indexed on RoE, and thus 
indirectly on the amount of economic capital allocated 
to the activity. This is sometimes the case for bonuses 
or the variable portion of salaries, which adds to the 
opacity of the procedures for calculating economic 
capital as a function of the risk actually generated 
by the activity. In the pursuit of higher bonuses, 
managers could be tempted to negotiate economic 
capital allocations that are too small relative to 
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the risks in the business line for which they are 
responsible. This would tend to increase the fragility 
and inadequacy of capital overall.
From a supervisory perspective, the indexation 
of banking outcomes on the amount of economic 
capital is all the more problematic, given that not all 
activities have a signiﬁ  cant economic capital charge. 
For example, credit card lending is characterized 
by losses being mainly represented by predictable 
expected losses (EL). Unexpected losses (UL) are 
particularly low, which implies a small economic 
capital allocation. However, even if the volume of 
unanticipated defaults for this type of activity is 
small, the supervisor must be able to assess this risk 
on the basis of a pool of credit card receivables. At the 
macro-prudential level, the sum of small amounts of 
defaulted or doubtful loans can lead to losses greater 
than initially anticipated for each portfolio.
Finally, certain risks appear to be directly linked 
to decentralized management based on economic 
capital. For example, management on the basis of 
RoE, in order to be effective, must be validated by 
managers. If analysts set unrealistic RoE objectives, 
this can result in excessive risk-taking to achieve 
the objectives, and thus under-provisioning of 
activities. Furthermore, the decentralization of 
risk management on the basis of economic capital 
allocations can create a risk of fraud or accounting 
manipulation which can be difﬁ  cult for the central 
risk management unit to control.
While economic capital models continue to be 
reﬁ  ned – in part to satisfy the requirements of the 
Basel II framework, which will bring them closer 
to regulatory requirements – important differences 
remain. These differences are justiﬁ   ed by the 
requirements of operational management, which is 
not always based on the same considerations as the 
regulatory management of risk. The two measures 
are not intended to be totally equivalent.
In practice, the level of economic capital observed 
in credit institutions is higher than the minimum 
level of regulatory capital. This reﬂ  ects the risk 
aversion of institutions and their desire to maintain 
their capacity to raise funds in capital markets. 
According to a study by Flannery and Rangan [2002] 
on the determinants of capital ratios in U.S. credit 
institutions between 1986 and 2000, two periods can 
be clearly distinguished. In the ﬁ  rst period, from 
1986 to the beginning of the 1990s, the Cooke ratio 
strongly inﬂ  uenced American banks to hold more 
capital. However, since 1995, the growth in capital 
and the maintenance of capital ratios in excess of 
regulatory requirements have been largely the result 
of market forces. Market discipline is therefore one 
of the key factors for the high level of capital held 
by American banks. 
3|2  Economic capital models 
do not incorporate the objective 
of limiting contagion, 
a risk for the stability 
of the ﬁ  nancial system
One of the great advantages of VaR is its ability to 
summarize in a single, easily interpreted number 
the risks borne by a ﬁ  nancial institution. For most 
trading activities, this calculation makes it possible to 
associate an amount of capital with a given volume 
of activity. The simple character of the indicator 
explains its rapid rise in popularity among ﬁ  nancial 
institutions. In 1994, J. P. Morgan began publishing 
a trading VaR in its annual reports, reporting a VaR 
of 15 million dollars at a horizon of one day and a 
conﬁ  dence interval of 95 percent.
However, a major difﬁ  culty in using VaR to monitor 
ﬁ  nancial stability is the individualized nature of 
the various risk measures. As discussed above, this 
fragmentation in operational management stems in 
part from the inability of models to aggregate the 
different measures of risk used for different business 
lines, different sectors of activity, or different risk 
factors. This problem is particularly important for 
ﬁ  nancial conglomerates and other large, complex 
ﬁ   nancial institutions, whose activities are both 
numerous and varied.
The global risk facing a ﬁ  nancial conglomerate or 
a large complex ﬁ  nancial institution can be greater 
than the sum of the risks facing the individual 
entities of which it is composed. Problems at one 
subsidiary can spill over to other entities within the 
group, through the effect of reputation. An initially 
isolated event can thus spread rapidly within a 
group, rendering the entire group more fragile. 
Thus the capital needed to cover a conglomerate’s 
global risk can be greater than the sum of the capital 
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requirements calculated for each of the entities in 
the group. From a supervisory perspective, this could 
justify higher capital requirements than economic 
capital models suggest.
The possibility of contagion within a group, with its 
implications for ﬁ  nancial stability and regulation, 
raises the issue of ‘too big to fail’ and associated 
moral hazard problems. The failure of a very large 
ﬁ  nancial institution could provoke the failure of 
other ﬁ  nancial institutions that have claims on it, 
threatening the overall stability of the ﬁ  nancial 
system. This phenomenon was observed on the 
occasion of the 1998 collapse of LTCM, which had 
very large positions at the largest international banks. 
The moral hazard incentives for major ﬁ  nancial 
institutions ﬂ  ow from the threat that their failure 
would pose to the ﬁ  nancial system. If their managers 
are convinced that they will be bailed out in case of 
a liquidity or solvency crisis, on the grounds that the 
failure of a major ﬁ  nancial institution would threaten 
the entire ﬁ  nancial system, they may become less 
vigilant in avoiding such crises than they should be 
in theory.
The implicit existence of a ‘too big to fail’ policy 
could therefore justify higher regulatory capital 
requirements than would otherwise be suggested by 
the ‘privileged’ position in the ﬁ  nancial system of a 
large, complex ﬁ  nancial institution.
On the other hand, there can be opportunities for 
netting the coverage of default events in different 
activities within a ﬁ   nancial conglomerate. If it 
engages in both banking and insurance activities, the 
relatively low correlation in the business cycles of 
these two sectors can permit the conglomerate to pool 
economic capital to some extent, so that its banking 
activity can support its insurance activity, or vice 
versa, in the event that either of the activities suffers 
unexpected losses as the result of an exogenous shock. 
This diversiﬁ  cation of activities within a ﬁ  nancial 
conglomerate can reduce the risk of contagion and 
protect the interests of shareholders.
Including diversiﬁ  cation effects in economic capital 
models assumes that the correlations between the 
returns or the losses in different activities can be 
estimated accurately. In VaR calculations, this means 
that it is possible to estimate the correlation between 
different risk factors. The lower the correlations 
between the risk factors within a given portfolio, 
the more the risk proﬁ  le of the portfolio is reduced. 
However, the correlation between risk factors usually 
varies over time, and it tends to increase during 
periods of ﬁ  nancial market turbulence. Yet many 
economic capital models do not treat correlation as time 
varying, but rather as a parameter that is constant over 
time. Furthermore, the period over which the mean 
correlation between risk factors is calculated does not 
always include a period of signiﬁ  cant stress, resulting 
in underestimation of the parameter, and therefore 
underestimation of the amount of capital needed to 
absorb unexpected losses.
To compensate for the weaknesses in the parameters 
used in VaR models, such as correlation, supervisors 
explicitly require institutions to conduct stress tests 
under Pillar 2 (Supervisory Review Process). 
Implicitly, this amounts to asking institutions 
to prove that the diversiﬁ  cation  effect  claimed 
remains valid and undiminished, even in the event 
of an recession or ﬁ  nancial crisis. In this sense, the 
regulatory approach aims at making the limitations 
of the models used to calculate economic capital 
more transparent.
While greater convergence between different 
economic capital models would clearly be desirable 
for the maintenance of ﬁ  nancial stability, particularly 
if it yielded better methods for measuring the 
effects of correlation and diversiﬁ  cation, perfect 
convergence would not be desirable.
The adoption of standardized, sophisticated techniques 
by all institutions could provoke a chain reaction 
in the event of a crisis: each institution, because it 
used the same underlying model, would interpret 
and respond to the shock identically. Instead of 
strengthening ﬁ  nancial stability, this would increase 
the risk of contagion, by increasing the correlation 
between the risk exposures of different ﬁ  nancial 
institutions.
This need to avoid absolute convergence in 
operational risk management strategies is explained 
by the modeling risk implicit in the development 
and use of these tools. The models are nothing
more than methodologies, and cannot be regarded
as autonomous decision-making processes. 
Modeling risk is very present in the calculation 
of VaR, depending on whether the model uses a 
parametric, historical, or Monte Carlo approach to 
Banque de France • Financial Stability Review • No. 7 • November 2005  71ARTICLES
Regulatory capital and economic capital
simulate losses with the variation in risk factors
(see article, “Signiﬁ  cance and shortcomings of the 
VaR ﬁ  gures disclosed by large ﬁ  nancial institutions,” 
in this issue).
In these circumstances, stress testing, adapted to each 
institution and each type of activity, is indispensable 
to provide a complete picture of the risk proﬁ  le 
of institutions. Stress testing can overcome the 
limitations of economic capital models discussed 
above. Its aim is essentially to analyze the tail of 
the distribution of risks and returns for institutions’ 
banking and trading books – that is, to measure risk 
in extreme crisis situations. 
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Economic capital can make a major contribution to the management and strategies of ﬁ  nancial institutions. 
It provides a common language that can be used throughout the institution, from senior management to 
operational units, in deﬁ  ning the institution’s business strategy, pricing transactions, evaluating performance, 
setting risk limits, and managing concentrations. 
However, there are major differences in the methodologies used by different institutions, and for different 
legal entities or different types of exposure within the same institution. These differences stem from the 
recent nature of these techniques, which have not yet been completely integrated and which, despite the 
progress that has been made, are very rarely implemented at the level of the banking group as a whole. 
Given these limitations, supervisors should take a cautious approach to the assessment of risk. From the 
perspective of supervising banks and maintaining ﬁ  nancial stability, the methodologies used by even the 
most advanced institutions still have signiﬁ  cant weaknesses, linked to modeling risk or to the methodologies 
for aggregating different measures of economic capital.
Although institutions are not all at the same stage in developing methods for determining and allocating 
economic capital, the adoption of Basel II will help accelerate their development. Pillar 2 of Basel II provides 
a particularly strong impetus for institutions to improve their management techniques. 
In addition to covering risks and allocating funds, the level of economic capital is linked to the business 
strategy and operational management of institutions, while regulatory capital has a macro-prudential 
dimension. Consequently, going beyond the question of the need for greater alignment between regulatory 
and economic capital, what is most important today is that these two concepts should enrich each other, 
proﬁ  ting from each other’s progress and inquiries, without the need for absolute convergence. 
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